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
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DE CONSUMO ALIMENTARIO RESPONSABLE



ADICAE

Asociación de Usuarios
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Vishal Narain • Annasamy Narayanamoorthy
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Indian Water Policy at the Crossroads: Resources, Technology and Reforms

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Political Power and Economic Policy

*Theory, Analysis, and Empirical
Applications*

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Water Resource Economics

The Analysis of Scarcity, Policies, and Projects
second edition

Ronald C. Griffin

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