Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10532/3460
Title: The Political Economy of Water Policy Design and Implementation in the Jucar Basin, Spain
Authors: Esteban Gracia, Encarna
Dinar, Ariel
Albiac Murillo, José
Calera Belmonte, Alfonso
García-Mollá, Marta
Avellá Reus, Lorenzo
Issue Date: 2016
Publisher: University of California
Series/Report no.: UCR SPP Working Paper Series
Abstract: Water scarcity has intensified conflicts between regions and interest groups for the use of water resources. Water policies have been implemented worldwide to face with water stress; however, existence of opposite interest between water users together with differences in their political power hinder the effectiveness of the water policy reform. A better understanding of users’ behavior is necessary to avoid the failure of water policies and the intensification of water scarcity problems and water conflicts. This paper empirically examines the perception of interest group about the implementation of different water policies to deal with water scarcity, and also their proactive involvement, or lobbying, with water organizations. We have conducted a survey in a water stressed basin in Southeastern Spain (Jucar River Basin) to analyze interest group opinions regarding water institutions’ performance and management; and the cost and benefits from group influence or lobbying on policy makers. The results highlight the existence of notably differences between the preferred measure to face with water scarcity together with sizable divergences in the active lobbying capacity of the interest groups depending on the size of the group, the specific basin location (upstream or downstream), and group characteristics.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10532/3460
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/es/
Appears in Collections:[DOCIART] Artículos científicos, técnicos y divulgativos

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